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Abstract 
When agents devise plans for execution in the 
real world, they face two important forms of 
uncertainty: they can never have complete 
knowledge about the state of the world, and they 
do not have complete control, as the effects of 
their actions are uncertain. While most classical 
planning methods avoid explicit uncertainty 
reasoning, we believe that uncertainty should be 
explicitly represented and reasoned about. We 
develop a probabilistic representation for states 
and actions, based on belief networks. We 
define conditional belief nets (CBNs) to capture 
the probabilistic dependency of the effects of an 
action upon the state of the world. We also use a 
CBN to represent the intrinsic relationships 
among entities in the environment, which persist 
from state to state. We present a simple 
projection algorithm to construct the belief 
network of the state succeeding an action, using 
the environment CBN model to infer indirect 
effects. We discuss how the qualitative aspects of 
belief networks and CBNs make them 
appropriate for the various stages of the problem 
solving process, from model construction to the 
design of planning algorithms. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Real-world planning poses special challenges which early 
planning systems did not fully confront. Typically, the 
domain models upon which real-world planners rely 
reflect incomplete and inaccurate understanding of the 
domain's ontology, the objects and events used to 
describe domain states, and its dynamics, the underlying 
principles that define object-event relationships in the 
domain. Due to such inherent limitations of scope and 
accuracy, real-world planners must cope with substantive 
uncertainty as they reason about actions and formulate 
plans. These planners must deal adequately with 
uncertainty about past, present, and future states of the 
world including uncertainty about the occurrence of 
particular events in the domain. These challenges are 
exacerbated by the reliance on imperfect sensor 
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information and the uncertainties introduced by the 
potential actions of other agents. 
Early planning systems, e.g., S1RIPS (Fikes and Nilsson, 
1971) and NOAH (Sacerdoti, 1975) presumed availability 
of a complete, accurate domain representation and, 
consequently, produced plans that would readily fail as a 
result of inadequacies in the domain model. As planning 
researchers began to address the challenges of uncertainty 
several approaches emerged, including replanning 
(Wilkins, 1988), interleaved planning and execution 
(McDermott, 1978; Georgeff and Lansky, 1987), reactive 
planning (Brooks, 1986; Kae1bling, 1987; Schoppers, 
1987), and conditional planning (Warren, 1976; Peot and 
Smith, 1992). These approaches reduce the negative 
impact of uncertainty on the quality of plans, but none 
represents and reasons about uncertainty explicitly. 
So far, several attempts have been made to integrate 
uncertainty representation and reasoning techniques into 
planning. Markov chains are used by Christiansen and 
Goldberg (1990) and by Dean et al. (1993) to depict a 
sequence of possible actions. Kanazawa and Dean (1989) 
use influence diagrams similarly to Markov chains, 
without exploiting their structure. Several efforts focus 
on the design of specialized projection algorithms (e.g., 
Dean and Kanazawa, 1989; Hanks, 1990; Drummond and 
Bresina, 1990). Recently, some probabilistic and 
decision-theoretic systems have been implemented 
(Kushmerick et al, 1994; Goldman and Boddy, 1994; 
Haddawy and Suwandi, 1994). Most of these approaches 
represent uncertainty probabilistically. However, 
Wellman (1990a) uses qualitative probabilistic networks, 
while Chrisman (1992) rejects Bayesian probability in 
favor of Belief Functions. 
Some of these probabilistic approaches contrast strongly 
with the more classical AI approaches. While it is agreed 
that transition matrices provide a complete representation 
for actions' effects and readily support probabilistic 
temporal projection, this representation poses extreme 
challenges. On the practical side, a daunting amount of 
assessment may be needed to construct a complete 
Markov transition matrix, and inference with matrices 
cannot easily support queries about specific properties of 
states. Perhaps more importantly, it remains unclear how, 
A Structured, Probabilistic Representation of Action 155 
if at all, matrices can be incorporated into anything like 
conventional planning techniques. 
In contrast, our approach to planning under uncertainty 
aims to incorporate a suitable treatment of uncertainty 
within a more conventional overall planning process. As 
a first step in this research we have focused on the 
representation of actions as operators that probabilistically 
transform states by specifying probabilistic relationships 
among their descriptive elements. We build our 
framework on belief networks (Pearl, 1988) and a variant 
thereof to represent conditional probability distributions. 
Contrary to the probabilistic planners mentioned above, 
we do not make the STRIPS assumption that anything that 
is not explicitly part of the action's model remains 
unchanged. In this respect, our work may be compared to 
recent research on action representation in belief networks 
(Goldszmidt and Darwiche, 1994; Pearl, 1994). We 
propose a simple projection algorithm that uses graphic 
operations to construct the probabilistic model that 
represents the direct and indirect effects of an action. Our 
action representation combines qualitative and 
quantitative description in order to support reasoning 
under uncertainty in the context of more conventional 
qualitative methods for reasoning about action. 
2 MODELING WORLD STATES 
The following example will motivate our presentation of 
this research: a robot is secretly attempting to fetch an 
object from a room in the WhiteWaterGate office 
building. The robot must avoid detection. It has a partial 
description of the object, including its location, size and 
weight. Upon locating the object, the robot is now 
reasoning about picking it up, but since it must 
accomplish the task wiUJ.out being detected, it also must 
assess the possibility of activating an alarm. Thus, the 
appropriateness of the pickup action depends upon the 
robot's model of the state of the world when the action is 
attempted, and its model of how the action, if undertaken, 
might affect critical distinctions1 in that state. 
Since the robot is uncertain about most aspects of the 
environment and the exact effects of actions, a 
probabilistic representation is called for. One possible 
approach would be to model the robot's situation as a 
probability distribution over all the possible states, with a 
conditional probability distribution for the states that may 
result from executing the action. An action is, thus, 
represented by a state-transition probability matrix. 
However, this representation technique hides important 
qualitative information about relationships in the domain 
that may be important to planning. A representation that 
provides explicit information about independence and 
conditional independence among distinctions in the model 
can make descriptions more compact and expressive 
while helping to improve efficiency of inference 
algorithms. We, therefore, represent world states (or 
1 A distinction is a predicate or a random variable describing some 
property of the task domain. 
simply states) by belief networks (Pearl, 1988) which 
depict the factorization of a joint probability distribution 
in a graphical manner: 
Definition 1: Let P(D) be a joint probability distribution 
over a set of distinctions D. Let G be a directed acyclic 
graph (D, R), where D is a set of nodes that correspond to 
the distinctions2, and R is a set of directed arcs. Let 
(dJo ... ,dn) be a node ordering consistent with G, i.e., if 
(d� d)E R then i < j. Let 7t(d) be the set of parents of node 
dinG: 7t(d) ={ceDI (c, d)ER}. Then, we say that G is a 
b elief network for P if for every node d;ED, 
P(d; I dl> ... ,d;.1) = P(d; l7t(d;)), and no arc can be removed 
from G without violating this factorization. Wf often 
attach the conditional probability distribution P(d; 7t(d;)). 
to the node d; and view the network as representing P. 
Definition 2: A state of the world W is a specification of 
the values of all the distinctions of interest at a snapshot 
of the real world. A joint probability distribution Pw(D) is 
a state model if it reflects the uncertain beliefs of an agent 
about W. We often use the corresponding belief network 
as a model for W. 
The belief network in figure 1 shows that the robot has 
some prior information about possible size and location of 
the object, and believes that object weight is related to 
size. (I.e., information about one of these features 
provides information about the other.) However, both 
these features are independent of (provide no information 
about) the object's location. The alarm has three 
independent sensor sources-light, sound, and motion. 
The robot believes that the value of each of these is 
probabilistically related to the alarm activation. Also, the 
chance of being discovered by a guard is believed to be 
related to the alarm activation. 
Figure 1: A World State 
(obi?\ v 
Several aspects of belief networks deserve mention. Fust, 
the most important qualitative information conveyed by 
belief networks lies in the arcs that are missing, i.e., in the 
2For this discussion, we need no« distinguish between a node in the 
graph and the model distinction it represents. 
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independen ce assertions. In figure 1, one can readily see 
the independence of object location from all other 
distinctions and the independence among the alarm 
sensors. This can be seen without examining quantitative 
information about the joint distribution through the 
graphical criterion of d-separation (Geiger et al, 1990). 
Second, arcs do not necessarily imply causality. Some 
arcs may be reversed without affecting the rest of the 
network (e.g., between object size and weight). In fact, 
any arc can be reversed, with possible modifications to the 
rest of the network (Shachter, 1986). Third, a node may 
be a deterministic function of its predecessors (e.g., the 
alarm is activated if, and only if at least one sensor is on), 
but generally, a node remains probabilistic even if 
predecessor values are known (e.g., the robot may not be 
discovered even if the alarm is activated). 
3 REPRESENTING ACTIONS 
World state models describe relationships within a 
specific state. We now model actions taking the standard 
view of actions as transitions between consecutive states. 
Thus, given the state of the world preceding the action, an 
action model defines probabilistic constraints on the state 
succeeding the action. In other words, an action could be 
described by a conditional probability distribution for the 
state succeeding the action given t11e state preceding the 
action. We do not wish, however, to require that every 
action be specified by a full probability matrix, for 
reasons stated above. We seek a compact representation 
that states only the intrinsic properties of an action. 
Before presenting the formal definition, consider the 
action of our robot picking up the object. The robot is 
uncertain whether the object will end up in its grasp. 
Thus, one probabilistic effect of the action is object 
location-the object may remain in t11e same location (if it 
is too heavy to lift, say), the object may fall to the floor (if 
its size makes it awkward to carry to the loading bay), or, 
hopefully, the object's new location may indeed be tile 
robot's bay. Another uncertain effect is the activation of 
the alarm by triggering one of the sensors. Thus, some 
distinctions in the model qualify the effects of the action, 
while other distinctions are affected by the action. So, for 
any model M of action A, we denote the set of qualifying 
distinctions in the state preceding A by qualM(A), and the 
set of the directly affected distinctions in tile succeeding 
state by effu(A). The notion of direct effects is captured by 
the definition below. In the sequel we omit the model 
designation M unless we discuss different models for tile 
same action. 
The following definition for qual(A) and eff(A) express 
our intent that these sets are tile minimal ones required for 
an adequate representation of A. The requirements we 
impose on these sets are in line with Wellman's 
characterization of probabilistic actions (1990). 
Definition 3: Let P and S be the sets of distinctions tllat 
correspond to the states that precede and succeed an 
action (respectively). Then, for every action A, qual(A)QJ 
and eff(A )� are defined to be the minimal sets of 
distinctions such that: 
• eff(A) is independent of P-qual(A) given qual(A) and 
the fact that A was performed 
• S-ejj(A) and P-qual(A) are independent of A given 
qual(A) and eff(A). 
The last requirement says that given qual(A) and eff(A), 
knowledge that A was performed does not convey any 
additional information about any distinction in the 
model3. Note that even if we have the full transition 
matrix (or the conditional probability distribution) that 
corresponds to action A, we cannot derive qual(A) and 
eff(A) directly, as our ability to distinguish the execution 
of action A depends on the other possible actions that 
could have been performed. Thus, qual(A) and eff(A) 
need to be specified by the domain expert. Once they are 
specified, P(eff(A) I qual(A)) can be considered as the 
compact model of the action. 
Definition 4: Let P(E I Q) be a conditional probability 
distribution. Then P is a nwdel for action A if Q=qual(A) 
and E=eff(A). 
As actions are defined in terms of conditional probability 
distributions, and in light of our emphasis on qualitative 
representation, we now define a variant of a belief 
network-a conditional belief net (CBN)-to graphically 
display a conditional distribution. 
Definition 5: Let P(E I Q) be a conditional probability 
distribution of E given Q (where Q and E are disjoint sets 
of distinctions). Let B be a directed acyclic graph 
(Q, E, R), where QuE is a set of nodes and Rb;(Qu£ )xE 
is a set of directed arcs. Let (Q, e1, ... ,en) be a node 
ordering consistent with B and let 1t(e) be the set of 
parents of node e in B. We say that B is a conditional 
belief network ( CBN) for P(E I Q) if for every node e;E E, 
P(e; I Q,eJ> ... ,e;.1) = P(e; 11t(e;)), and no arc can be removed 
from B without violating this factorization. 
Note that the order of the nodes in Q is irrelevant as there 
are no arcs going into nodes in Q. For these nodes, only 
their list of possible values needs to be specified. Since a 
CBN (Q, E, R) does not specify a probability distribution 
for the nodes in Q, we often term Q as the set of free 
distinctions of the CBN. while tile set E is the set of 
bou nd  distinctions, as they are constrained by a 
probability distribution. 
A model of tile pickup action is given in figure 2. The 
nodes surrounded by a rounded rectangle represent tile 
affected distinctions in tile succeeding state. A special 
node marks the action's name, with an outgoing arc into 
the effects. Although this extra node is redundant, it will 
prove useful in representing the combined effects of 
simultaneous actions and for the construction of decision 
models for sequences of actions. 
3Moreover, qual(A) and eff(A) render A independent of any distinction 
in the past or in the future. 
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How should we interpret figure 2? Object location is 
affected by the action. Its value in the succeeding state 
depends (probabilistically) on its location before the 
action and on the object's size and weight. The model 
relates the status of the sound sensor after the action to its 
status before the action (if it was on, it will probably 
remain on), and to the object location after the action 
(since if it falls to the floor, it makes noise). Note that the 
alarm activation is not specified as a possible effect of the 
action. It was not judged to be a direct effect of the 
action. 
qual( A) eff(A) 
Figure 2: An Action Model 
4 THE ENVIRONMENT MODEL 
A belief network represents the relationships between 
distinctions within a particular state. Effective reasoning 
about action requires that we understand and represent 
contingent relationships that extend beyond any specific 
state. These relationships are inherent in the environment 
or the system we model, and we can use them to achieve 
goals (e.g., to induce rain we can seed clouds) and to 
avoid undesirable side effects (e.g., if we make noise, we 
might trigger the sound sensor). 
The knowledge that characterizes invariant relationships 
in an uncertain system or environment is best described 
by conditional probability distributions (in much the same 
way that dynamic systems are described by differential 
equations). These conditional relations are contingent 
upon inputs whose distribution may not be known at 
modeling time. For example, we do not know the status 
of the sound sensor in general, but we may know the 
conditional probability of alarm status given sensors' 
status, and this conditional relation holds for every 
possible state of the world. 
We collect all the relationships that are expected to hold 
in every state into a conditional probability distribution, 
designated as the Environment Model. While these 
relations are not changed by any action the agent may 
take, they may change in particular states due to 
observ ations. Thus, if the agent hears the alarm in a 
certain state, it is no longer probabilistically related to the 
status of its sensors in that state. 
Definition 6: Let D be the set of distinctions in terms of 
which states are described. Let (F;H) be a partition of 
D: D=FuH, FnH=0 such that the set of probabilistic 
relationships P(H I F) is believed to hold in every state. 
The conditional distribu tion P (H IF) (and its 
corresponding CBN) are called the Environment Model. 
The set of the free distinctions F is not constrained by the 
Environment Model. The bound distinctions in the set E 
are constrained to the same distribution in every state 
(unless observations are available). 
Figure 3 displays the Environment Model for the robot's 
example. The free distinctions, for which no probabilistic 
information is specified, are the object location and the 
three sensors. The distribution of all other distinctions 
(the bound distinctions in the rounded rectangle) is 
believed to be the same in all states. 
free bound 
Figure 3: The Environment Model 
The Environment Model can be transformed into a world 
state model by adding a probability distribution for the 
nodes in F. This transforms the CBN into a belief 
network, from which we can derive the marginal 
probability of every distinction of interest. We can draw 
an analogy between the Environment Model and a set of 
differential equations that defines a physical system. The 
free distinctions correspond to the boundary conditions of 
the system, whose specification permits one to calculate 
the entire behavior of the system. 
5 STATE PROJECTION 
Temporal projection is about inferring the state of the 
world after an action is taken. We now present a 
projection algorithm exploiting our CBN -based 
representations. 
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The state that succeeds an action depends, in general, on 
the preceding state and on the action's model. The 
algorithm below constructs a belief network that 
combines bo th  the preceding and the succeeding states, 
and the relations between them. The model of the 
succeeding state can then be extracted from the combined 
network. 
Algorithm Project_State 
lnJ;uU: A belief network Gp over D representing the 
preceding state and a CBN B over QuE that represents 
an action A 
Qmwtl: A belief network Gps over DuE representing the 
relations between the preceding and the succeeding states, 
and a belief network G s over D representing the 
succeeding state 
1. Initialize Gps to the network Gp of the preceding state. 
2. Augment Gps by the CBN B in the following way: 
A. Coincide the free nodes Q (in B) with the nodes 
with the same label in Gps . 
B. Add the bound nodes E to Gps as succeeding-state 
nodes. These nodes inherit their probabilistic 
information (their incoming arcs) from B. 
C. Let F be the distinctions in Gp that correspond to E 
(i.e., the distinctions in the preceding state that are 
affected by the action.). Let K be the set of 
descendents of F in Gp : K=u des(!) - F, where feF 
de s(j) are nodes to which there exists a directed 
path in Gp fromf. The nodes inK are duplicated, �o that a new �opy of these nodes is added to Gps 
m the succeedmg state. The new nodes carry their 
probabilistic information (their incoming arcs) 
from the preceding state in Gps . Whenever 
possible, these arcs originate from a new copy of a 
node, i.e., from the succeeding state. 
3. Gs can constructed from Gps by computationally 
removing the set FuK of nodes from the preceding state 
of Gps . The resulting belief network Gs represents the 
succeeding state. 
A node is computationally removed (step 3 in the 
algorithm) following the procedure described in 
(Shachter, 1986). The procedure essentially averages out 
a node, so that the distribution of its children is properly 
updated. For most purposes, it is advised not to perform 
step 3, and use the combined network Gps for inference, 
so as not to lose relevance information across states. In 
other words, if the purpose of projection is to construct a 
probabilistic model that corresponds to a sequence of 
actions, step 3 should not be performed. (In this case, step 
2.C requires that new arcs originate from the most recent 
copy of a node). If, however, the purpose of projection is 
to calculate the marginal probabilities for the distinctions 
in the succeeding state, step 3 is necessary. 
Fi�ure 4 depicts the combined network for the pickup 
actiOn of our robot example. The input to the algorithm is 
the preceding state as depicted by figure 1, and the action 
model in figure 2. The nodes in E (the direct effects: 
object location, sound sensor and motion sensor) are 
added to the network of the preceding state, with their 
incoming arcs. These nodes are distinguished by the 
rounded rectangle, while all the succeeding-state nodes 
are annotated by s under their label. In the next step, the 
nodes in K (the indirect effects: alarm, guard) are added 
to the succeeding state, with their incoming arcs 
originating from succeeding-state nodes, if possible. For 
example, the alarm node has two incoming arcs from new 
nodes, but the arc from the light sensor node comes from 
the preceding state. 
Figure 4: State Projection 
Note that the nodes in D-F-K are not affected by the 
action and are not copied into the succeeding state. We 
could, of course, copy them as deterministic identity 
functions of their value in the preceding node. 
We can project the succeeding state from the combined 
network by computationally removing all the nodes FuK 
in the preceding state. The node removal algorithm 
(Shachter, 1986) assures that the probability distribution 
of the remaining nodes is consistent with the agent's 
beliefs. Figure 5 depicts the succeeding state network Gs. 
We can now ignore the annotation by s since the network 
includes exactly all the distinctions in D of the succeeding 
state. 
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Figure 5: The Projected State 
6 PROJECTING STATES CORRECTLY 
Note that the network in figure 5 (the succeeding state) 
has a different structure from the one in figure 1 (the 
preceding state). In particular, object size became 
probabilistically relevant to object location and motion 
sensor, and similarly, information about the sound sensor 
is relevant to object location. Thus, the action introduced 
informational relationships between entities in the 
domain. 
There is a potential problem with our very flexible 
approach. Suppose next, our robot performs an action 
that directly affects the size of the object (e.g., cutting it 
into half). Our projection algorithm would infer an 
indirect effect on both the object location and the motion 
sensor. Similarly, the robot may now have a silent way to 
move the object, so a subsequent change in object location 
need not necessarily have the status of the sound sensor as 
an indirect effect. The main point here is that these 
informational relations that are introduced by the action 
do not necessarily persist from one state to another. If a 
subsequent action affects a distinction d that is associated 
with another distinction e, the new value ds in the 
succeeding state need not be related toe ores. 
In general, the algorithm as outlined above is sensitive to 
the direction of the arcs in the network of the preceding 
state. Since every arc can be reversed employing the 
graphical equivalent of Bayes' rule (Shachter, 1986), our 
projection algorithm may yield different results given 
different graphical representations of the preceding state. 
These difficulties should not come as a surprise. As Pearl 
(1994) notes: "While (a probability distribution) tells us 
everything about responding to new observations, it tells 
us close to nothing about responding to external actions" 
(p. 204). Thus, the model of the preceding state cannot be 
sufficient. Additional assumptions must be made. 
To resolve the problem we tum back to the Environment 
Model. Recall that the Environment Model represents the 
probabilistic relations that are believed to hold in every 
world state. These are the only relations that we must 
guarantee to hold in the succeeding state. In other words, 
these are the relations that persist from state to state, 
unlike the other relations in a state, which are purely ad­
hoc. 
We modify slightly the projection algorithm from the 
previous section to rely on the Environment Model to 
derive the indirect effects of an action (instead of on the 
network of the preceding state). The modified algorithm 
accepts as input the Environment Model V too, and it 
differs only in the method of identifying and deducing the 
indirect effects. 
Algorithm Project_State (modified) 
!.nl2m: add the Environment Model V to the original inputs 
Perform steps l-2.B as in the original algorithm. 
2.C. Let F be the distinctions in V that correspond to E 
(i.e., the distinctions in the Environment Model that 
are directly affected by the action). Let K be the set 
of descendents of Fin V: K= u des(J)- F, 
[eF 
where des(j) are nodes to which there exists a 
directed path in V from f. The nodes in K are 
duplicated, so that a new copy of these nodes is 
added to Gps in the succeeding state. The new 
nodes carry their probabilistic information (their 
incoming arcs) from the V. These arcs originate 
from the most recent copy of a node. 
As before, nodes can be removed to derive a belief 
network that represent the succeeding state solely. 
For the robot's example above, the combined network for 
the pickup action would be the same with the modified 
algorithm (with the Environment Model in figure 3 as an 
additional input) as it was with the original algorithm. 
That is, the modified algorithm projects the same 
succeeding state as in figure 5. However, if a subsequent 
action changes the location of the object independent of 
the sensors, the modified algorithm would not infer the 
sound sensor (and the rest of the alarm system) as indirect 
effects. They would retain their values from the 
preceding state. 
Without imposing any restriction on action models, a 
potential conflict might arise between the direct effects of 
actions and relations in the Environment Model. If a 
bound distinction e in V is a direct effect of an action A 
(i.e., if eeefj(A)), then it is not clear whether e should be 
defined in the succeeding state as in the action model or 
as in the Environment Model (as we assumed that e is 
bound to the distribution in V in all states). We gave 
absolute priority to the action model in the projection 
algorithm, but this is an arbitrary decision. 
As we discuss in section 7, we believe that such a conflict 
is a result of poor modeling, and we therefore introduce 
the following restriction on action models: 
Definition 7: A model M for action A is said to be 
compatible with the Environment Model V if the direct 
effects e.f!M(A) are restricted to the free distinctions of V. 
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From now on, we assume that all action models are 
compatible with the Environment Model. It is not 
difficult to verify to that with this restriction on actions, 
the modified projection algorithm preserves consistency 
of state models with the Environment Model: 
Definition 8: A state model W is consistent with the 
Environment Model V if for every bound distinction h in 
V, Pv(h ITrv(h)) = Pw{h l 1rv(h)), where 1rv(h) is the set of 
parents of h in V. 
Proposition 1: If the model of the preceding state is 
consistent with the Environment Model V, and the action 
model is compatible with V, then the model of the 
succeeding state, as derived by the modified projection 
algorithm, is consistent with V too. 
Note that the original projection algorithm satisfies this 
proposition as well. This is to say that proper projection 
cannot be judged only by the consistency of the resulting 
state with the relations in the Environment Model. 
Rather, it is the appropriate handling of the distribution of 
the free distinctions that makes the difference. 
Note that we are unable to assert an objective criterion for 
the correctness of the projection algorithm. We can only 
verify that the projection procedure is consistent with the 
assumptions we make (proposition 1), argue for the 
reasonability of these assumptions and test them. 
Our primary assumption is that there are probabilistic 
relations between entities in the real world that are 
expected to hold in every state (unless modified by an 
observation of one of the relevant entities). Moreover, we 
assume that all other probabilistic relations are just 
informational relationships that hold only for specific 
entities at the specific time when they are asserted. 
The persistent relationships in the Environment Model are 
reminiscent, of course, of causal networks (Pearl, 1988). 
These are belief networks in which all arcs are asswned to 
have a causal meaning. This strong assumption is made 
by (Pearl, 1994) and (Goldszmidt and Darwiche, 1994) to 
permit reasoning about action and change within the 
framework of belief networks. Indeed, as Druzdzel and 
Simon (1993) note: "The effect of a structural change in a 
system cannot be induced from a model that does not 
contain causal information" (p. 4). We delay to a 
forthcoming paper the discussion of the causal 
interpretation of our Environment Model, as well as a 
comparison to the contemporary works mentioned above 
and that of Heckerman and Shachter (1994). 
7 PROPERTIES OF ACTION MODELS 
We now briefly discuss the restriction we imposed on 
actions to affect only free distinctions in the Environment 
Model, and the uniqueness properties that result. 
Without the compatibility restriction, an action A could 
have models with different effects sets effM(A) that would 
be projection-wise equivalent: they would result in the 
same succeeding state. This would happen if some effects 
set included non-direct effects as part of the action model, 
i.e., if a modeler fails to distinguish the genuine direct 
effects from those that result from relationships in the 
environment. Compatible models can never be equivalent 
for every preceding state, as any free distinction not in 
ef M(A) persists when M is used for projection. 
The compatibility restriction is useful beyond avoiding 
conflicts between action models and the Environment 
Model, and promoting uniqueness of effects. It also 
facilitates modeling (knowledge acquisition) in the 
following way: if a need arises to model a bound 
distinction h as an effect, the Environment Model V is not 
complete, since it ignores a possible way to affect h. For 
example, if V specifies Pv(grass I rain) and we identify 
a way to affect grass (e.g., by turning the sprinkler on), 
we conclude the V is incomplete as it neglects the 
influence of s p r 1 n k 1 e r on grass. Instead, V should 
specify Pv(grass I raln,sprlnkler). 
In general, the sets qual�A) are not unique. For example, 
if V contains a deterministic bound distinction h, then any 
model M with hE qualM( A) has an equivalent model M' 
with Trv(h)-{h}EqualM·(A). If, however, all distributions 
are strictly positive, the intersection property (Pearl, 1988, 
p. 84) can be used to define a minimal unique qualifiers 
set qual(A). 
8 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
We have presented a scheme for modeling the states of 
the world and the effects of actions in a probabilistic 
fashion. We use belief networks to represent world states, 
and conditional belief nets to represent actions and 
environmental contingencies. Our representation scheme 
enjoys the advantages of qualitative modeling and the 
precision of quantitative models. The representation 
supports efficient projection and prepares for intelligent 
planning by emphasizing the properties and the structure 
of states. The framework is flexible, and can be extended 
in several ways (Davidson, 1994). 
Our work is influenced by the classical action­
representation schemes such as STRIPS (Fikes and 
Nilsson, 1971) and the situation calculus (McCarthy and 
Hayes, 1969). Like STRIPS, our action models depict the 
relationships among preconditions and effects, though we 
relate them probabilistically. STRIPS suffers from the 
need to explicitly specify the truth value of all formulas 
that could possibly be affected by an operator. Attempts 
to eliminate the problem (Wilkins, 1988) allow a set of 
basic formulas to appear in add/delete lists, from which all 
other formulas are calculated. Our approach is similar: 
action models may affect only the free distinctions in the 
environment, while all other distinctions are conditioned 
upon the free ones, and cannot be affected directly. 
Any scheme similar to the situation calculus suffers from 
the frame problem. Our solution to the extended 
prediction problem is similar to STRIPS': we assume 
persistence of whatever is not affected, but we handle 
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indirect effects. Moreover, our framework addresses the 
qualification problem by acknowledging that a model can 
never exhaust the qualifying distinctions in the real world, 
and therefore, all effects are probabilistic. 
Our work on this scheme continues. We believe that the 
framework will prove appropriate for decision-theoretic 
planning, whereby maximum expected value is the 
criterion for the optimality of plans. We are now at work 
to introduce levels of abstraction into this representation 
scheme, and to devise a hierarchical planning algorithm 
for this approach. 
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